DSpaceUnipr
DSpaceUnipr is the institutional repository of the University of Parma. Its aim is to give visibility to the University's scholarly content and learning material.
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/1889/902Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Magnani, Marco | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2008-06-06T15:43:23Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2008-06-06T15:43:23Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2008-06-06T15:43:23Z | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1889/902 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | The present paper analyzes the determinants of political consensus on relevant aspects of the Social Security System and focus on the choices over employment protection and retirement age; a theoretical model is build where an equilibrium setup results from a political process involving three social groups: young, low and high productivity old. Hypothesis and results of the model are tested using macro data. The aim of the analysis is to provide some insight on the reasons why some institutional setups are supported by voters and implemented while others don’t. | en |
| dc.language.iso | Inglese | en |
| dc.subject | Social security system | en |
| dc.subject | Labour market | en |
| dc.title | Labor Market Regulation and Retirement Age | en |
| dc.type | Conference lecture | en |
| dc.contributor.sponsor | University of Parma | - |
| dc.subject.miur | SECS-P/02 | en |
| dc.subject.JEL | D72 | en |
| dc.subject.JEL | H55 | en |
| dc.subject.JEL | J63 | en |
| dc.description.fulltext | open | en |
| Appears in Collections: | XVI Conferenza Scientifica Nazionale AISSEC | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| submission2.pdf | articolo principale | 385.61 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License
